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Abstract
We investigate asymmetries in the relationship between the aggregate rate of
inflation and the second and third central moments of the cross-sectional distribu-
tion of relative prices using a modified Calvo pricing model with regime-dependent
price rigidities. Calibration experiments using realistic parameterisations reveal
that the inflation-standard deviation and inflation-skewness relationships exhibit
U-shaped asymmetries around the historical mean rate of inflation. We conclude
that monetary policy should target a level of inflation proximate to the (common)
minima of these nonlinear relationships and that core inflation measures exclude
much of the information contained in the higher moments of the distribution of
price changes.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A substantial literature has explored the relationship between inflation and inflation un-
certainty, which is widely held to be positive following the seminal contributions of Fried-
man (1977) and Cukierman and Meltzer (1986).1 The menu-cost theory advanced by
Ball and Mankiw (1995) supports a positive relationship between aggregate inflation and
the standard deviation of relative price changes (often termed relative price variability,
RPV ). Moreover, they propose a positive association between the mean and the skew-
ness of relative price changes (henceforth relative price skewness, RPS). They contend
that firms facing menu-costs will only adjust their prices if the benefit outweighs these
costs. Therefore, if the distribution of relative price changes exhibits positive (rightward)
skewness, then mean inflation is likely to increase as a small group of firms engage in
significant price increases while a large group of firms desire price decreases too small to
be economically viable. Mutatis mutandis in the case of leftward skewness. The menu-
cost model implies a fundamental interplay between RPV and RPS, as RPV should have
no systematic effect on mean inflation if relative price changes are symmetrically dis-
tributed, at least in the absence of trend inflation (see Aucremanne et al., 2003 for a
detailed discussion). An alternative view is offered by Tobin (1972), whose discussion of
exogenous downward nominal rigidities in labour and product markets implies a nega-
tive mean-RPS relationship. This pattern will arise naturally where more rapid inflation
facilitates relative price adjustments in the presence of strong downward nominal rigidity.
Until recently, the empirical literature has shed little light on these divergent views.
The majority of existing studies have analysed aggregate (national) inflation rather than
exploiting the informational content of disaggregated (sectoral) data. Even where studies
have employed sectoral data, the focus has typically been on the mean-RPV relationship.
While the analysis of time-varying higher-order moments is well-established in a range
of macroeconomic and financial settings (e.g. Hansen, 1994; Harvey and Siddique, 2000;
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Dittmar, 2002; Jondeau and Rockinger, 2003; Brooks, 2005), relatively little research
effort has been devoted to similar analyses of the mean-RPS relationship.2
Recently, however, a growing literature on time-variation and nonlinearity has shed
new light on the relationship between aggregate inflation and volatility. Choi (2010)
provides robust evidence of time-variation in the inflation-RPV relationship in the U.S.
and Japan on the basis of a modified Calvo model, finding a monotonic association in
periods of high inflation but a U-shaped relationship during the ‘Great Moderation’.
Similarly, Fielding and Mizen (2008) and Chen, Shen and Xie (2008) observe a U-shaped
mean-RPV relationship in the US and in four Asian economies, respectively. Evidence in
favour of a U-shaped mean-RPV relationship has also been derived from monetary search
models employing Burdett-Judd pricing (Head, Kumar and Lapham, 2010; Becker and
Nautz, 2010). In this case, the asymmetry arises from the interplay of firms’ market
power and consumers’ search intensity at various rates of inflation. Specifically, increases
in the rate of inflation can be welfare-improving at low levels of inflation as they increase
search-intensity more than market power. However, beyond a threshold rate of inflation
the reverse is true, and increasing inflation becomes welfare-reducing. Becker and Nautz
estimate the value of this threshold to be approximately 3% in Europe.
Despite the weight of evidence supporting the nonlinear mean-RPV association, we
are unaware of any systematic analysis of asymmetries in the relationship between mean
inflation and RPS. We therefore contribute to this literature by developing a simple
framework that utilizes both the informational content of the higher-order moments and
the time-variation of the cross-sectional distribution, thereby overcoming the biases that
could result from the presence of informational heterogeneity across sectors (Pesaran and
Smith, 1995). Moreover, the possibility that the mean-RPS relationship may exhibit var-
ious nonlinearities in turn raises the possibility of a reconciliation between the seemingly
conflicting views of Ball and Mankiw (1995) and Tobin (1972) in the sense that both
mechanisms may operate under different conditions.
Based on our analysis of UK sectoral CPI inflation data over the period 1997m1-
2008m2, we note that the first three cross-sectional moments are highly persistent. The
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mean of the sectoral inflation rates is correlated with both the cross-sectional variance
and skewness, although the direction of the association is contingent upon the location
of average inflation rates relative to (adaptive) inflation expectations. More specifically,
we observe a U-shaped relationship between both mean and RPV and between mean and
RPS, and a linear association between RPV and RPS. Developing upon Choi (2010),
we conduct calibration experiments on the basis of a modified Calvo (1983) model with
regime-switching price rigidities. Our results convincingly verify a U-shaped relationship
between mean inflation and RPV under a wide range of parameterisations. Moreover, we
note that the mean-RPS relationship is linear and positive where marginal costs display
only mild persistence, but that it exhibits the characteristic U-shape at the higher levels
of persistence observed in the UK data. By comparing the distribution of sectoral price
changes implied by Choi’s model and by our regime-switching model against the distribu-
tion of actual price changes, we find that our regime-switching mechanism is important
in providing an accurate characterisation of the higher moments of the distribution of
sectoral price changes.
We conclude that in an optimal inflation targeting framework, the target should be
set in the neighbourhood of the minimum-RPV rate of inflation such that monetary pol-
icy innovations act to maintain price stability while also minimising inflation uncertainty.
Inflation in this range is also consistent with a near-symmetric (mildly left-skewed) distri-
bution of relative price changes, indicating an economy free from pricing distortions that
may otherwise exert undesirable allocative effects and reduce economic cohesion. Finally,
we conclude that policymakers should not rely unduly on core measures of inflation as
they obscure a great deal of valuable information contained in the higher moments of the
distribution of relative price changes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports stylized findings
evident in the UK data. Section 3 elaborates upon our calibration-based experiments and
Section 4 evaluates the performance of our DGPs in terms of their ability to replicate the
distribution of observed price changes and their sensitivity to the use of core CPI data.
Section 5 concludes.
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2 STYLIZED FACTS
Our analysis of UK sectoral inflation draws heavily on Chaudhuri, Kim and Shin (2011,
henceforth CKS).3 We utilise CKS’s dataset, which is based on subsector consumer price
indices and the associated weights obtained from the Office for National Statistics. Work-
ing at the three-digit level and using data spanning the period January 1997 to February
2008, CKS construct a sample of 134 monthly observations. This sample spans the period
of independent monetary policy in the UK leading up to the late 2000s Global Financial
Crisis. It follows, therefore, that it relates to an approximately homogeneous monetary
policy regime4.
The mean inflation rate in our sample (measured across sectors and over time periods)
stands at 1.5 percent while the median is 1.6 percent.5 Inflation uncertainty measured by
the cross-sectional standard deviation shows considerable time-variation, while inflation
exhibits a positive skew in just 51 out of 134 months. In addition to this time-variation, we
observe considerable heterogeneity across sectors. Liquid fuels experienced the highest
rate of inflation over our sample (10.5 percent) and information processing equipment
the lowest (-22.3 percent). Sectoral standard deviation ranges from 0.4 percent for social
protection to 26.5 percent for liquid fuels. Inflation exhibits a positive skew in 49 of the
85 subsectors under scrutiny, reflecting the tendency toward positive skewness widely
noted in the literature (e.g. Aucremanne et al., 2003).
Figure 1 reproduces part of CKS’s Figure 2. A pronounced U-shaped relationship
between both mean and RPV and also between mean and RPS is immediately apparent,
while the RPV-RPS relationship appears approximately linear. To investigate these pat-
terns more formally, we compute the correlation between the first three cross-sectional
moments evaluated at each time period. We employ a simple two-regime threshold model,
distinguishing between high and low inflation regimes according to whether current infla-
tion exceeds the mean level measured through time (the latter can be viewed as expected
inflation assuming adaptive expectations). Table 1 reports the results.
– Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 here –
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The relationship between the mean and the higher order moments is positive in the
high inflation regime and negative in the low inflation regime. The association between
mean and RPV is measured at 0.32 and -0.21 in the high and low inflation regimes,
respectively. The equivalent figures for the mean-RPS relationship are 0.29 and -0.20.
These findings cast doubt on the widely held belief that the association between aggre-
gate inflation and RPV is positive. Moreover, U-shaped nonlinearity in the mean-RPS
relationship suggests that menu-cost considerations may dominate when inflation ex-
ceeds expectations but that Tobin’s downward nominal rigidities play a more significant
role when inflation is lower than expected. Lastly, we observe an approximately linear
RPV-RPS relationship that remains positive irrespective of the regime, although it is
considerably stronger in the high inflation regime. Given the similarity of the nonlinear
forms of the mean-RPV and mean-RPS relationships, it follows from transitive reasoning
that the RPV-RPS relationship should be approximately linear.
3 A MODIFIED CALVO MODEL WITH REGIME-DEPENDENT PRICE
RIGIDITIES
Choi (2010) develops a modified Calvo model that describes the U-shaped mean-RPV
relationship rather well, although he does not address nonlinearities in the mean-RPS
relationship. In this section, we extend Choi’s approach to accommodate this more
general case. Choi considers the following calibration-based data generating process:
log
(
Pit
Wt
)
= λi log
(
Pi,t−1
Wt−1
)
− λi
(
1− βρ
1− λiβρ
)
log
(
Wt
Wt−1
)
, i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, . . . , T,
(1)
where Pit denotes sectoral prices, β the discount factor, λi the degree of price rigidity
(with λi = 1 indicating perfect rigidity), and Wt the common marginal cost generated by
the following AR(1) process:
log Wt
Wt−1
= ρ log Wt−1
Wt−2
+ t, t ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
with |ρ| < 1. (2)
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The sectoral prices derived under equations (1) and (2), which we denote DGP1, are
generated by:
pit = λipi,t−1 + γiwt − δiwt−1, i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T, (3)
where
pit = lnPit , γi =
1− λi
1− λiβρ , wt = lnWt , δi =
λi (1− λi) (1− βρ)
1− λiβρ ’ pi0 = 0 ,
and where the degree of price rigidity is assumed to be uniformly distributed as λi ∼
U (a, b) with 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1.
Choi (2010) implicitly assumes that the degree of price rigidity is independent of the
characteristics of the firm or sector. It is, however, well established that pricing behaviour
depends upon a range of factors including the competitive structure of the industry or
sector (Martin, 1993; Head, Kumar and Lapham, 2010). We introduce this form of
heterogeneous regime-dependent rigidity in a simple manner as follows, yielding DGP2:
pit = (λ1itpi,t−1 + γ1itwt − δ1itwt−1) 1{pi,t−1<wt−1}+(λ2itpi,t−1 + γ2itwt − δ2itwt−1) 1{pi,t−1≥wt−1}
(4)
where
γjit =
1− λjit
1− λjitβρ and δjit =
λjit (1− λjit) (1− βρ)
1− λjitβρ for j = 1, 2,
and where 1{pi,t−1<wt−1} is a Heaviside function taking the value of unity if the price is lower
than the marginal cost and zero otherwise. The regime-dependent rigidities are uniformly
distributed such that λ1it ∼ U (a, b) if pi,t−1 < wt−1 while λ2it ∼ U (c, d) if pi,t−1 ≥ wt−1,
with a < c and b < d. In this framework, price rigidities are generally stronger in the
second regime when price exceeds marginal cost. This implies that firms operating with
market power or in a weakly competitive environment will set their prices in a relatively
rigid fashion. By contrast, in the first regime, price is less than marginal cost. Such
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a situation may arise due to strategic pricing behaviour (e.g. price competition), slow
adjustment in the wake of a cost shock or due to government subsidies. We assume greater
price flexibility in this regime, reflecting the imperative to maintain a positive income
stream over anything but the (very) short-run. We also assume that |∂λjit/∂dit| < 0
where dit = pi,t−1 − wt−1. This introduces an inertial mechanism akin to menu-costs,
whereby price rigidities are lower in those sectors which experienced large differences
between price and marginal cost in the previous period.6
Using these DGPs, we conduct a range of calibration-based experiments. In each
case, we employ 1000 replications with (N, T ) = (100, 200) and we follow Choi’s (2010)
selection of common parameter values of β = 0.99 and σ = 0.01. We consider 17 different
values of the AR coefficient in equation (2), i.e. ρ = {0.1, 0.15, ..., 0.85, 0.9} and draw the
price rigidities uniformly from the range of values recorded in Table 2.7
– Insert Table 2 here –
The lower and upper bounds for DGP1 are the same as those set by Choi (2010).
Under DGP2, we employ the same range of values in a global sense but now we distinguish
between lower and higher rigidities. Importantly, we allow the ranges of λ1i and λ2i to
overlap. This provides greater generality than a strict separation between their values.
Consider a simple case with two firms identified as A and B with heterogeneous pricing
rigidities λ1A and λ1B. Let us assume that λ1A < λ1B. It would be excessively restrictive
to assume that in the second regime λ2A > λ1B. Rather, if the degree of price rigidity in
the second regime is to exceed that in the first regime, it is sufficient that λ2A > λ1A and
λ2B > λ1B.
For each DGP, we estimate the following nonlinear U-shaped (more accurately V-
shaped) relationships between the higher moments (RPV and RPS) and the aggregate
inflation rate:
RPVt = c+ θ1pit1{pit≤p¯i} + θ2pit1{pit>p¯i} + e1t, (5)
SKt = c+ ϕ1pit1{pit≤p¯i} + ϕ2pit1{pit>p¯i} + e2t, (6)
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where pit = N−1
∑N
j=1 pijt and p¯i = T−1
∑T
t=1 pit. Without loss of generality, we set p¯i = 0
in all cases.
Figure 2 plots the average coefficients across replications, denoted θ¯1, θ¯2, ϕ¯1 and ϕ¯2.
We observe a strong asymmetric mean-RPV relationship under both DGPs. Irrespective
of the value of ρ, the relationship is positive in the higher inflation regime and negative in
the lower regime, although the differential decreases somewhat as ρ increases. An inverse
association between the degree of asymmetry and the value of ρ is intuitively plausible,
as increasing the degree of persistence of firms’ marginal costs reduces one source of
uncertainty that they must consider when setting their prices.
– Insert Figure 2 here –
As noted by Choi (2010), a U-shaped mean-RPV relationship suggests that the as-
sociation between inflation and inflation uncertainty does not depend upon the rate of
inflation as such, but rather upon the deviation from a threshold rate of inflation. This
threshold may represent a societal norm for inflation in which the economic system is rel-
atively stable in the neighbourhood of the threshold and where deviations from it reflect
shocks which are naturally associated with increased volatility. Interestingly, while his
results suggest that the adoption of inflation targeting monetary policy reduces the min-
imum RPV rate of inflation, it is not always the case that this threshold coincides with
the inflation target. Therefore, under certain circumstances, inflation targeters may have
to trade lower inflation against greater uncertainty. More specifically, this may occur if
the declared inflation target is set below the minimum RPV rate of inflation.
Moving on to the mean-RPS relationship, under DGP1 we observe a negative as-
sociation that differs little between regimes, a finding that contrasts sharply with the
majority of empirical studies that report a positive association (e.g. Ball and Mankiw,
1995; Balke and Wynne, 2000). It seems that Choi’s DGP cannot reproduce the asym-
metric mean-RPS relationship evident in Figure 1, indicating that it is only partially
consistent with observed empirical regularities. Indeed, given the common observation
of a positive linear RPV-RPS relationship and the robustness of Choi’s U-shaped mean-
RPV relationship, one would expect to observe a U-shaped mean-RPS relationship on the
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basis of transitivity. Its absence may, therefore, indicate that Choi’s DGP is misspecified.
By contrast, under the extended framework of DGP 2, we observe a positive linear
mean-RPS relationship for ρ < 0.7 with a U-shaped relationship emerging thereafter. Im-
portantly, the degree of persistence of marginal costs required for asymmetry is consistent
with the UK data over our sample period. Using a simple AR(1) model of aggregate wage
inflation, we estimate the AR coefficient as 0.706 with a standard error of 0.129.8
– Insert Figure 3 here –
In conjunction with the stylised findings summarised above, our calibration exercises
have a number of significant implications. Firstly, the positive mean-RPS association
observed for low to moderate values of ρ suggests that the Ball-Mankiw view dominates
where marginal costs are relatively flexible and becomes weaker as ρ increases. The
switch to a negative association for ρ > 0.85 suggests that the downward nominal rigidi-
ties discussed by Tobin become more significant as marginal costs become increasingly
persistent. This is an intuitively pleasing result because it follows that menu-cost con-
siderations should be more pressing when marginal cost shocks are unpredictable (i.e. ρ
is small) but that as marginal costs become more persistent, so firms become more con-
strained in their ability to make downward nominal adjustments and, therefore, become
increasingly reliant on real adjustments.
It is, however, the transitional range 0.7 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.85 that is of particular interest as
this is where the U-shaped mean-RPS relationship emerges and it is also consistent with
the UK data during our sample period. Within this range, our results support our stylized
finding that Tobin’s negative mean-RPS relationship dominates in the low inflation regime
while the positive relationship associated with the menu-cost model dominates in the high
inflation regime. This implies that when marginal costs are sufficiently persistent that
neither menu-costs nor downward nominal rigidities dominate price-setting behaviour,
then the inflationary regime plays a key role in price-setting. In a high inflation setting,
firms are less constrained in their ability to make rapid relative adjustments to overcome
nominal rigidities, but the menu-costs associated with price changes become increasingly
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important. The linkage to the widely discussed ‘grease’ and ‘sand’ effects of inflation is
readily apparent (Aucremanne et al., 2003).
At an over-arching level, our results indicate that both the Ball-Mankiw and Tobin
explanations may be applicable under different feasible parameter sets. This is an impor-
tant result, because each model has different implications for the conduct of monetary
policy. In the former, low and stable inflation is desirable as it reduces the losses associ-
ated with regular costly price adjustments. By contrast, in the latter, the central bank
may prefer somewhat more rapid inflation as it would prevent the build-up of potentially
harmful pricing distortions due to downward nominal rigidity.
Taken together, these results suggest that the optimal level of inflation will be near the
turning point of the mean-RPS relationship, which also coincides with the minimum RPV
rate of inflation due to the linearity of the RPV-RPS relationship. Under the common as-
sumption of a positively sloped linear mean-RPV relationship, the pursuit of low inflation
and low inflation uncertainty go hand-in-hand. However, as noted by Choi (2010), where
the mean-RPV relationship is U-shaped, a central bank may reduce economic welfare by
pursuing disinflationary policies if they are associated with rising uncertainty. Similarly,
given that RPS measures the degree of symmetry of price adjustments, it follows that
large absolute values of RPS indicate that price adjustment is concentrated in certain
sectors which may be indicative of undesirable economic (allocative) distortions.
At present, inflation targets tend to be set in a rather ad hoc manner, taking into
account rough notions of mismeasurement of the price index, quality enhancements and
productivity gains. However, our results provide a more formal method of determining
an appropriate inflation target. If the inflation target is to act as a nominal anchor, it
follows that this can be most readily achieved if inflation uncertainty is minimised and
the distribution of relative price changes is approximately symmetric. The latter is likely
to be especially important where the patterns of expenditure of different economic and
social groups show considerable heterogeneity that may expose some groups more than
others to inflation in specific sectors, such as liquid fuels and staple foods. Therefore,
provided that it would not move the economy too close to the zero lower bound on
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nominal interest rates, the inflation target should be set within the neighbourhood of the
turning points of the mean-RPV and mean-RPS relationships.9
The usefulness of our analytical framework is not limited to the case of countries that
wish to adopt inflation targeting: it also provides a means of assessing the appropriateness
of existing inflation targets. In the case of the UK, it is interesting to note that Choi
(2010) reports a 95% confidence interval for the minimum-RPV rate of inflation of 0.8-
1.9%. This range is generally consistent with Figure 1, above, which also suggests a
turning point lower than 2% but still within the Bank’s 1-3% permissible range. This
suggests that if the Bank of England were to target a lower rate of inflation than it
currently does, inflation uncertainty may fall.10 By contrast, if a central bank targets
a rate of inflation below the turning point of the U-shaped mean-RPV and mean-RPS
relationships, then it is likely that increasing the target may lead to welfare gains due to
reduced levels of volatility and pricing distortions. Finally, we contend that in a system
with no declared inflation target, the common turning point may provide a useful proxy.
4 EVALUATION OF THE REGIME-SWITCHING CALVO MODEL
We have demonstrated that our regime-switching Calvo model can replicate an important
stylized finding from the UK sectoral data, namely the asymmetric U-shaped patterns
that characterise the relationships between the mean and the higher moments of the
distribution of sectoral price changes. We now turn to the question of whether our
calibrated model can successfully replicate the distribution of actual price changes in the
UK data. Furthermore, we will also briefly discuss the implications of our findings for
the debate over the relative merits of headline and core measures of inflation.11
4.1 Replicating the Distribution of Sectoral Price Changes
To establish a benchmark, we first evaluate the degree to which Choi’s DGP can approx-
imate the distribution of sectoral price changes. To this end, we estimate the parameters
λˆi, γˆi and δˆi from equation (3) for each sector.12 To replicate the properties of the dataset
as closely as possible, we then generate prices for 85 sectors over 134 months. The dis-
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tribution of standardised price changes at each time period is then estimated using the
kernel density estimator
(
fˆt
)
with 1,024 grids. Finally, we take the average of these
distributions through time
(
i.e. f¯ = (1/134)∑134t=1 fˆt) and compare f¯ with the average
distribution of actual price changes
(
f¯0
)
, which is also estimated using the kernel density
estimator.
In the case of DGP2, we employ the same procedure but consider the following time-
invariant specification of equation (4) because of difficulties estimating the time-varying
parameters given the available data:
pit = (λ1ipi,t−1 + γ1iwt − δ1iwt−1) 1{pi,t−1<wt−1}+ (λ2ipi,t−1 + γ2iwt − δ2iwt−1) 1{pi,t−1≥wt−1},
(7)
As before, we estimate
(
λˆ1i, γˆ1i, δˆ1i
)
and
(
λˆ2i, γˆ2i, δˆ2i
)
for each sector and filter λˆ1i and
λˆ2i for outliers before comparing the calibrated and actual distributions.
Figure 4 compares the calibrated distributions based on DGPs 1 and 2 against the
distribution of actual price changes. In both cases, the calibrated and actual distributions
are very close to one-another, implying that both models can replicate the properties of
the real data rather well given data-based parameters. The main difference between the
two DGPs is that DGP1 exhibits a mild right skew and is slightly platykurtic, while DGP
2 is more centred but somewhat leptokurtic.
– Insert Figure 4 here –
It is not obvious from visual inspection which DGP more closely matches the distribu-
tion of actual price changes. Indeed, the absolute distance of the calibrated distributions
from the actual distribution appears to be similar in both cases. The nonparametric
estimates of the first four moments for each of the three distributions reported in Table
3 provide a basis for more detailed comparison. These reveal that DGP 1 is closer to the
actual distribution in terms of both mean and variance, while DGP2 is closer in terms of
skewness and kurtosis.
– Insert Table 3 here –
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We also compute the following three formal divergence criteria: (i) the uniform norm
(DU), (ii) the Hilbert norm (DH), and (iii) the generalised entropy measure (DE). These
are defined respectively as
DU
(
f¯ , f¯0
)
=
∫ {
f¯ (x)− f¯0 (x)
}2
dx∫
f¯ (x)2 dx+
∫
f¯0 (x)2 dx
, DH
(
f¯ , f¯0
)
=
supx
∣∣∣f¯ (x)− f¯0 (x)∣∣∣
supx f¯0 (x)
and DE
(
f¯ , f¯0
)
=
∫
f¯0 (x) g
(
f¯ (x)
f¯0 (x)
)
dx
where f¯ is the calibrated distribution, f¯0 the actual distribution, and where g (y) =
(γ − 1)−1 (yγ − 1) with γ > 0 and γ 6= 1.13 All three quantities are non-negative and
return a value of zero if f¯ = f¯0.
Table 4 reports the divergence measures for each DGP. We find that DGP 1 presents
a smaller value than DGP 2 for the uniform norm, while DGP 2 presents a smaller value
for the entropy measure. In the case of the Hilbert norm, the difference between the
DGPs is negligible.
– Insert Table 4 here –
We must conclude, therefore, that both DGPs describe the actual distribution to a
similar degree of accuracy, but that DGP2 gives a better characterisation of the higher
moments. The observation that DGP2 better captures the higher moments of the dis-
tribution of sectoral price changes is intuitively plausible given our earlier finding that
DGP1 is incapable of replicating the U-shaped mean-RPS association observed in the
raw data.
4.2 Core Inflation
There is considerable debate among economists about the relative merits of headline and
core measures of inflation. A widely held position is that by excluding the highly volatile
food and energy sectors, core inflation may achieve a higher signal to noise ratio (e.g.
Bryan and Ceccheti, 1994). An obvious question, therefore, is whether similar U-shaped
mean-RPV and mean-RPS relationships characterise both headline and core inflation
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data, or whether the asymmetries are driven by the more volatile sectors. Figure 5
reproduces the graphs from Figure 1 in the case of core CPI.14
– Insert Figure 5 here –
It is immediately apparent that the U-shaped mean-RPV and mean-RPS relationships
are greatly attenuated when working with core CPI. Indeed, while the negative association
in the low inflation regime remains, there appears to be no significant relationship between
the mean and either RPV or RPS when inflation is above the historical average. This is an
interesting finding which suggests that the Ball-Mankiw menu-cost approach may largely
break down once the highly volatile food and energy sectors are removed. In essence, the
menu-cost model assumes that desired price changes are only affected if they exceed a
threshold value. It follows, therefore, that removing the most volatile sectors from the
dataset will reduce the proportion of cases in which the desired price change exceeds
the menu-cost threshold. When viewed in this way, Figure 5 suggests that the desired
price changes in the non-food and non-energy sectors in the UK over our sample period
may generally have been too small to be enacted in the presence of non-negligible menu
costs. It follows similarly that removing the most volatile sectors would not completely
undermine the Tobin-style mechanism; rather it would weaken it and reduce the speed
with which firms can achieve downward relative price adjustments. This is consistent
with the patterns reported in Figure 5(b).
This line of reasoning cautions against the use of core inflation for policy purposes,
especially in economies where menu-costs are thought to be important. While core CPI
may, in some cases, provide clearer signals about inflationary trends than headline CPI,
it does so at the expense of valuable information about the higher moments of the dis-
tribution of sectoral price changes. The Ball-Mankiw and Tobin models emphatically
stress the fundamental role played by these higher moments in facilitating price adjust-
ments. Moreover, the higher moments of inflation may exert a strong influence on infla-
tion expectations. It follows, therefore, that policymakers should attach greater weight
to headline inflation data than to simplified, truncated measures. Given that inflation-
targeting monetary policies are set with recourse to inflation forecasts, it follows that
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CKS’s work on forecasting the time-varying distribution of sectoral inflation rates may
provide policymakers with an invaluably enriched information set.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper extends the modified Calvo (1983) model developed by Choi (2010) by allow-
ing for regime-dependent price rigidities. Using this framework, we examine asymmetries
in the relationships between the mean of sectoral inflation rates and the higher order
moments of their distribution. Our calibration exercises reveal an asymmetric U-shaped
relationship between both mean and RPV and between mean and RPS under plausible
parameterisations. More specifically, where sectoral price rigidities are relatively strong
and marginal costs relatively persistent, an economy in which firms are not constrained
to engage in marginal cost pricing at all times may deliver U-shaped asymmetries in both
the mean-RPV and mean-RPS relationships.
Our findings have important implications for monetary policy, as an inflation targeting
central bank may face a trade-off between low inflation on the one hand and increased
volatility and absolute skewness of relative price changes on the other. We conclude by
suggesting three avenues for continuing research. Firstly, as with Choi (2010), we limit
our attention to the case of common marginal costs across sectors. The extension to
heterogeneous costs may better reflect sectoral skills differentials, for example, and may
yield deeper insights into pricing behaviour. Secondly, we develop DGP2 on the basis of
the obvious case of imperfect competition. However, our specification represents a very
simplistic case that could be readily refined and extended. Moreover, price rigidities may
depend on a wide range of other factors such as the mean level of inflation (Devereux
and Yetman, 2002). Finally, in light of the pervasive international evidence of U-shaped
relationships between aggregate inflation and volatility adduced herein and by Becker
and Nautz (2010), Chen, Shen and Xie (2008), Fielding and Mizen (2008) and Choi,
further research into optimal policy design and coordination in a cross-country setting
should be viewed as a priority.
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NOTES
1. We note in passing that while Friedman argues that higher inflation leads to higher uncertainty,
Cukierman and Meltzer stress that it is uncertainty which is inflationary.
2. A notable exception is Balke and Wynne (2000), which analyses both the mean-RPV and mean-RPS
relationships, finding positive correlations in both cases. More recently, Aucremanne et al. (2003) have
carefully analysed sectoral data in Belgium, and have also found the Ball-Mankiw model preferable to
the Tobin model. Our work extends beyond the scope of these studies due to our handling of nonlinearity
in the mean-RPS relationship.
3. CKS employ a semi-parametric functional autoregressive approach to model and forecast the time-
varying distribution of UK sectoral inflation rates. Their model performs admirably in a range of forecast
evaluation tests.
4. The policy framework is homogeneous in the sense that the central bank has manipulated the short-
term interest rate to achieve a declared inflation target throughout this period. Some subtle changes have
been made to the target itself during this time, but there has been no fundamental change in the policy
stance of the Bank of England (in particular, note that our sample period ends prior to the enactment
of quantitative easing at the Bank of England). While it would be interesting to consider earlier periods
in order to evaluate the effect of inflation targeting on the mean-RPV and mean-RPS relationships, no
comparable data are available for the UK prior to 1997.
5. Due to space constraints we do not report detailed descriptive statistics – they are available on request.
6. Note that according to Klenow and Kristov (2008) the simple time-dependent Calvo model cannot
account for the distribution of price changes in the firm level data. The Calvo model treats the magnitude
of price changes as endogenous but the timing/frequency of individual price changes as exogenous. In
the state-dependent sticky price models (SDP), firms decide to change the price subject to menu costs.
The SDP models by Midrigan (2011), Gertler and Leahy (2006) and Dotsey, King and Wolman (2006)
show better performance in terms of matching the price changes with inflation. Our modified Calvo
model can be viewed as an amalgamation of the time-dependent and the state-dependent models as we
specifically allow for regime dependent price rigidities.
7. To ensure that our results are not dependent on the assumption that price rigidities are uniformly
distributed, we repeated our analysis while drawing the price rigidities from a variety of different dis-
tributions, including a truncated normal distribution. The calibration results show little sensitivity to
such changes. Details are available on request.
8. Using a threshold specification, we estimate AR coefficients of 0.715 and 0.699 respectively in the low
and high inflation regimes, although we cannot reject the null hypothesis of symmetry. Note, however,
that Choi (2010) sets ρ = 0.9.
9. As noted above, these turning points coincide in our analysis. This is likely to be a fair approximation
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of reality given the linearity of the RPV-RPS relationship. Further support for this view is provided
by Becker and Nautz (2010), who show that the minimum point of the mean-RPV relationship in their
search model is modestly higher but very near to the welfare maximising rate of inflation.
10. An alternative interpretation is that the Bank of England has been operating according to a de facto
target that is lower than its declared target, and that the observed turning point reflects this de facto
target (or perhaps public perceptions of the latter). In cases like this, where the turning point does not
coincide with the declared target, policymakers may be acting with discretion. For example, the Bank
of England may aim for a level of inflation slightly below the centre point of its 1-3% target band if
policymakers are inflation-averse. If this is the case, however, one must ask whether the declared target
should be revised downward.
11. A good example of the differing views regarding headline and core inflation can be found by comparing
Smith (2004) and Crone et al. (2011). While the former argues in favour of using core inflation to forecast
the rate of inflation in the US, the latter holds that core inflation is not necessarily the best predictor
of total inflation and that the forecasting performance depends on the inflation measure and forecasting
horizon. The debate continues.
12. wt is only available at quarterly frequency, so we generate monthly values by interpolation under the
assumption that ρ = 0.7. In a small minority of cases we observe λˆi > 1, which is inconsistent with the
theoretical condition 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Hence, we apply a simple filtering rule by replacing any values larger
than 0.99 with 0.99. Note that we have obtained qualitatively similar results for different values of ρ
between 0.7 and 0.85.
13. For our purposes, we set γ = 1/2.
14. We construct core CPI by excluding both the food sectors (1-9) and the energy sectors (25-28), and
then adjusting the weighting scheme accordingly.
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Table 2: Distribution of Price Rigidities
DGP1 DGP2
λi λ1i λ2i
Lower bound 0.60 0.60 0.70
Upper bound 0.99 0.90 0.99
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Table 3: Comparison of Central Moments
Moments Actual DGP 1 DGP 2
Mean -0.007 -0.006 0.015
Variance 1.172 1.212 0.894
Skewness -0.521 -0.911 -0.844
Kurtosis 6.017 3.845 6.230
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Table 4: Comparison of Divergence Criteria
DGP1 DGP2
Uniform Norm 0.0769 0.0935
Hilbert Norm 0.0024 0.0025
Generalised Entropy Measure 0.0051 0.0041
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Figure 1: The Relationship between Cross-Sectional Moments
(a) Mean:RPV
(b) Mean:RPS
(c) RPV:RPS
Note: Triangular (circular) markers indicate that inflation is below (equal to or above) average.
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Figure 2: The Relationship between Aggregate Inflation and Higher Order Moments
(a) DGP 1: RPV (b) DGP 1: RPS
(c) DGP 2: RPV (d) DGP 2: RPS
Note: b(L) and b(H) denote the low inflation and high inflation regime-specific coefficients, respectively.
The horizontal axis records the value of the AR(1) coefficient, ρ.
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Figure 3: U-Shaped Relationships between Aggregate Inflation and Higher Order Mo-
ments
(a) DGP 2 (ρ = 0.75): RPV (b) DGP 2 (ρ = 0.75): RPS
Note: The horizontal axis records the aggregate rate of inflation relative to the mean.
The vertical axis shows the estimated response based on equations (5) and (6).
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Figure 4: The Distribution of Standardised Price Changes
(a) DGP 1 (b) DGP 2
Note: The distribution of standardised price changes is estimated by the kernel density estimator. The
solid line represents the average of the empirical distribution from the actual data, while the dashed
line represents the average of the calibrated distribution from the model.
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Figure 5: The Relationship between Cross-Sectional Moments using Core Inflation Rates
(a) Mean:RPV
(b) Mean:RPS
(c) RPV:RPS
Note: Triangular (circular) markers indicate that inflation is below (equal to or above) average.
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